As ters to make some statement to your lord- in the country, and yet, at the same time, so much dissatisfaction. It was a dissatisfaction not arising from a turbulent disposition in the people of this country, or from any marked reverses, or from the pressure of the public burthens, but a dissatisfaction produced by a feeling most honourable to the nation. The dissatisfaction was proportioned to the zeal and expectation of the country. It was not content either with the extent of the exertions that had been made to aid the Spaniards, or with the manner in which they were employed. Some statement, he trusted, would be made to allay this very laudable feeling of the public mind. His lordship here declared that he rose chiefly for the purpose of qualifying the assent he should give to the greatest part of the Address. With the reservation he had made, and that the means which led them. I have not, however, my lords, would be liberally given would not be misemployed; that the sacrifices of blood and treasure that the people of this country were disposed, beyond all example, to make, would be spent for the glory of the nation, and the honour of his Majesty's crown, he would give his assent to the Address. He wished, however, not to be considered as committing himself to its full extent, but merely as concurring in that part which recommends a vigorous prosecution of the war, and expresses a determination to assist Spain, so long as Spain shall prove true to herself. He also concurred in the expediency of increasing our military means in proportion to those of the enemy with whom we have to contend. ever wished to conceal my opinion, with respect to the policy of sending a British army to Spain. I do not mean to say, that there might not be circumstances under which it might be advisable and expedient to send British troops into Spain; but I mean to assert that, during last summer, there was no prospect that ought to have induced any reasonable men to send a British army into the interior of Spain. I am anxious not to be misunderstood upon this point. I do not mean to apply my observation to naval co-operation, to the mode of sending fleets with troops on board to annoy particular parts of the coast, to keep the enemy in a constant state of alarm, and obtain partial advantages which may be of essential service. I confine myself to the policy of sending a British army into the interior of Spain, and I contend, that there was not that prospect which ought to have induced reasonable men to have so sent an army. Nor were there any circumstances which could justify the sending a British army, large, it is true, as a British army, but small, as an Lord Grenville rose and spoke nearly as follows: It could not but be imagined, my lords, that there were parts of the Address in which it was impossible for me to concur, but I most willingly gave way to other lords who wished to deliver their sentiments. It was the constant practice, until the present administration came into office, to refrain both in the Speech and the ❘ army acting on the continent, to meet the Address from calling upon parliament, to deliver any decided opinion approving of past measures, the documents relating to which were not in the possession of the House, or expressing a determination to support any future system, the details of which had not been communicated. We are now, on the contrary, called upon to express our decided approbation, not only of past measures, but of a future system of which no explanation is given. Surely, it must be deemed incumbent upon minis whole disposable force of France, without having any of the great powers of Europe as our auxiliaries. With the Pyrenees unlocked, and the road between Paris and Madrid, as open as that between Paris and Antwerp, there was nothing which could justify our sending into the interior of Spain thirty or forty thousand British men to meet an army of 500,000. I can only compare such a measure to the far-famed march to Paris, to which it is fully equal in wildness and absurdity. It is perfectly clear 1 4 that it must rest with the Spanish people themselves to maintain their independence, and that without that spirit amongst themselves no army that we could send would be of any avail. They adopted a system, which was published in the early part of the summer, under the title of "Precautions," and which contained a most excellent plan of defence adapted to the peculiarities of the country, and calculated to harrass and annoy an invading army, and to wear them down by a continued system of partial attack, without incurring the risk which must necessarily attend a pitched battle with regular and veteran troops. This system was the best which could be adopted by that country, under its then circumstances, and might have produced a great effect upon the enemy, whose troops would have been continually harassed and fatigued, whilst the Spaniards, taking advantage of the peculiarities of their country, would have incurred little immedate risk, and would have gained a knowledge and attained a discipline which might have subsequently qualified them to contend in the field with the regular troops of France. This excellent system we forced them to abandon, by sending into the interior of the country a British army: it then became impossible for the Spaniards to leave our army to fight their battles by itself; our army would, of course, proceed in the manner and according to the usual routine of a regular army; and thus the Spaniards were forced on to engage in pitched battles, at a period when they were not competent, with regular troops, whilst the British army, too small to cope with the great superiority of troops brought into the field by France, can only retreat. In this way, my lords, I contend that the sending a British army into the interior of Spain has been actually injurious to the cause of the Patriots in that country. I waited anxiously towards the close of last session for some communication on the subject of Spain, which I did expect Ministers would have made for the purpose of obtaining the decision of Parliament. Had such a communication been made, I should certainly have delivered my opinion as to the impolicy of sending British troops into the interior of Spain. Ministers, however, chose to act without asking the advice of Parliament, and in what way have they contributed to the assistance of the Universal Spanish Nation,' as it has been called? In what manner have they afforded the aid of which they now so much boast? Setting aside for a moment the consideration of the general question of the policy or impolicy of sending British troops into the interior of Spain, it may be said, that there was a time when a British force of 30 or 40,000 men might have contributed to obtain a great temporary advantage, which, whatever effect it might have had upon the ultimate fate of the war, would at least have enabled the Spaniards to arrange their defence, and to mature their preparations. It may be said, that there was a period of the contest when the French having been driven from Madrid, and forced to take refuge in the neighbourhood of the Pyrenees, a British force, sent there at that particular crisis, might have driven the French beyond the Pyrenees, and placed in the hands of the Spaniards the keys of their country, which they might then have been enabled to defend under infinitely more advantageous circumstances than they had since been placed in. It might be said, that this case did, from peculiar circumstances, actually occur. Allowing it to be so, how was it taken advantage of? One might have supposed, that, to make the proper use of such an advantageous c conjuncture o of affairs, our troops would have been sent to the port nearest the scene of action, and from whence they might be marched, in the shortest time, to the spot where their services were most wanted. But, instead of the nearest port, the farthest seemed to have been chosen, and the troops were sent to Lisbon. They are there employed in compelling the French to evacuate Portugal, who could not have held it if Buonaparté could not conquer Spain, and who must get possession of it if he does; and afterwards remain there for two months before they march to join the Spaniards. The moment was urgent, the occasion was pressing, every thing depended upon promptitude of action, and taking advantage of a small portion of time; and yet two months pass away before the army is even put in march to join the Spanish troops; and the general who commanded in chief, in giving an account of his conduct, says, that no arrangement was determined upon for putting the army in march. The transports which ought to have conveyed our troops are used to convey the troops of the enemy; and our army, compelled to make a long march over land, are too late for any effective purpose, and the enemy triumphs in the 1 capital of Spain before even a British musket is fired. The Spanish people may truly reproach us, "You promised us protection and assistance; you induced us to and the Armistice which preceded it. An Armistice of which the House knows nothing; a Convention of which the House knows nothing. I was wondering what engage in the dangerous warfare of pitch-answer would be returned to that part of sure must apply of course to the conduct | when the proper time for the discussion sed, and which is no other than this-that whatever acts of injustice may be committed by the enemy, gives us a right to commit acts of injustice equal in degree and extent, under the pretence of retaliation-a principle in itself so horrible and absurd, that there is nothing so criminal or extravagant that it would not sanction. In all their former definitions of retaliation the acquiescence of the neutral was supposed as indispensible to authorize the exercise of it: but in this letter the doctrine is broadly laid down, that whatever ❘ the enemy does you have a right to do also. Upon this principle you might send an army to dethrone the king of Sweden, and to place one of the princes of the blood royal of England upon his throne, because Bonaparte has dethroned the king of Spain, and given the crown to his brother. In short, were this principle once generally admitted, there could be nothing sacred among men. The proposition of America, it ought also to be recollected, went farther than to hold out a prospect merely of repealing the embargo. It went so far as to say, that if you would rescind your Orders in Council, not only should the ed battles, quitting our more desultory mode of warfare, but more secure to ourselves and more harrassing to the enemy; and now the oppressor lords it in our capital, plunders our property, and puts to death our nobles, whilst not a single British musket has yet been fired." Shame that such a reproach should truly attach to us! Most unfortunate is it that our army should be placed in such a situation which must necessarily give rise to apprehension. The dilemma stated by my noble friend (lord Sidmouth), most aptly applies to ministers upon this subject: either they did or they did not know that a British army, sent into the interior of Spain, would have to encounter the whole disposable force of France. If they did know it, by what infatuation could they have been induced to place an army in a situation in which no rational men would ever have thought of placing it; if they did not know it, then they must confess that they were wholly ignorant of the resources of France-that they were wholly ignorant that the ruler of France had the resources of the greater part of Europe at his command-that they were wholly ignorant that France had a large army which could be brought to bear upon any given point. With this view of the subject, it is, of course, impossible that I can concur in applauding the past measures adopted by ministers with respect to Spain; nor can I concur in supporting the system proposed to be adopted for increasing the army, with the view of sending more troops to Spain, for this must be the object, or the expression means nothing; although I do not mean to deny, that with the evils with which we are now surrounded, the increase of our regular force is a necessary measure. To the approbation, however, which is implied of their conduct, and their wise and vigorous system, I must decidedly dissent, contending, as I do, that there has been neither wisdom nor vigour in their measures. When praising themselves for wisdom and vigour, I wonder they did not add success, as that term would have been equally applicable with the two former. - There is one point, my lords, in the Speech and the Address, to which I feel it indispensably necessary to advert, I mean the Convention of Cintra, the Speech, and it was with no small surprize I heard it moved, as part of the Address, an expression of our regret, that such an Armistice and Convention should have been entered into. What! my lords, pronounce judgment before investigation; condemn a transaction before we are made acquainted with the details of it? I have now heard, for the first time, that his majesty has found it necessary to express his disapprobation of some of the articles of that Armistice and Convention, and from that circumstance it will of course form a future subject of discussion in this house, but at present they are not regularly before us. It is true, that the public have had those transactions before them, and have pronounced their condemnation; the people of England have complained of those transactions at the foot of the throne, and I cannot applaud the tone of the Answer, which was returned to the Address of the City of London. It being, however, contrary to the principles of British justice to pronounce judgment without investigation, what must we expect, after unequivocally condemning the Armistice and Convention, of which we know nothing, neither the documents, nor any details respecting the transaction being before us? what must we expect upon going to the foot of the throne with an Address, containing such an unequivocal condemnation without examination, or the means of examination? we must expect to be told, "You, the parliament, have forgotten the first principles of British justice in pronouncing judgment without investigation, in condemning a transaction with the details of which you are unacquainted." The Armistice and Convention have, it is known, been referred to a Board of Military Officers, who have reported that no blame attaches to any of the generals employed on that occasion. That Board of Inquiry have abstained, and very properly abstained, from giving any opinion respecting the conduct of ministers; but from the displeasure expressed by his Majesty, it is evident that they alone were to blame-the Board having declared their opinion that no blame attaches to the generals, and his Majesty having subsequently expressed his displeasure at the Armistice and Convention, that displeaof ministers. The generals may alledge the want of cavalry; they may alledge the want of artillery-all which must arise from the neglect of ministers. This must of course form a part of the Inquiry when the subject comes regularly before the house. There is another point also of considerable importance, upon which the Board of Inquiry have very properly abstained from giving an opinion, I mean the naval part of the transaction; I do not mean to convey any censure upon the admiral who agreed to the Convention, or to insinuate that he stands in any other situation than that of the generals, to whom it is decided that no blame attaches; but when, instead of that phraseology to which we have been accustomed in the transactions of our navy, that of sunk, burnt, and destroyed, when, instead of taking prisoners of war, a Convention is entered into, by which the fleet of an enemy comes into our ports with a stipulation, that it shall be delivered up at the conclusion of peace, it becomes a subject which demands inquiry and investigation. That investigation will, I trust, take place, and then our decision will follow regularly and formally; but to applaud or to condemn, without investigation, conveys neither approbation nor censure. There is one most important topic which I think it my duty to press upon the attention of your lordships, though no notice is taken of it either in the Speech or the Address; I mean the present state of our relations with the United States of America. The noble lord who moved the Address has indeed stated, that the embargo was advantageous to this country. Without entering at length into the discussion of the question, there is one thing of which I entertain no doubt, that it is to the measures of the British government that we owe the embargo, and that it was laid on in America in contemplation of our Orders in Council. If there ever could be any doubt upon this subject, that doubt was completely removed in the month of July last, when it was proposed by the government of the United States, that the embargo, in as far as it regards us, should be taken off, provided our Orders in Council were rescinded. From that time, therefore, a new era commenced, at which the embargo began (if it was not so before) to be the effect of our own choice; and so far from its being a measure advantageous to this country, I am prepared to shew VOL. XII. arrives, that instead of being advantageous, it is extremely injurious to our interests, and will prove still more detrimental than past experience has shewn it to be, if it is continued. But even the interruption which it has occasioned to the commercial intercourse between the two countries, though a great and serious evil, is not the only nor the worst mischief with which it is pregnant. The wish to maintain mutual relations of peace and amity, is, I believe, the prevalent sentiment among the people, both of this country and America; but I am afraid that the government of neither of the two countries corresponds with the popular sentiment. I am ready to acknowledge, that the government of the United States has, in more instances than one, manifested a considerable partiality to the side of France. But I cannot, on the other hand, acquit the British government of a want of fairness in its proceedings towards America. The people of this country, I am firmly persuaded, desire nothing more than to live at peace with America; but I am as firmly persuaded, that the intention of the king's government is to drive things to extremity with America. I know that. there are some persons amongst us who are mad enough to believe, that a rupture between the two countries is an event rather to be desired than deprecated. They think, that were such a case to happen, we should sweep every ship from the seas, and monopolize the commerce of the world. Wild imagination! Who does not know that commerce is most desirable when the advantages of it are mutual, and that it can only thrive by reciprocity ? But, supposing that it was desirable that we should engross the whole commerce of the world, are we likely to attain our object by compelling other nations to renounce the use of our manufactures, and to refuse to supply us with their commodities? I say I believe it to be the intention of government to force matters to a rupture with America; for, if this were Am not their intention, would they have neglected, as they have done, the opportunity which occurred in the course of the season of effecting a compleat and cordial reconciliation? But, instead of embracing this opportunity with eagerness, in the insulting and sophistical answer written by his Majesty's foreign secretary of state, a principle is laid down still more objectionable than any which they had formerly profes C have been entered into, but that they are to be ratified by a solemn treaty. Upon the negociation it would be premature to deliver any opinion, till the papers containing the correspondence are before the House. I must, however, be permitted even now to observe, that his Majesty's Declaration is at variance with the Speech, respecting the ground upon which the correspondence was broken off. In the Declaration the rupture was ascribed to the refusal of Buonaparte to abandon his views upon Spain, and in the Speech it is attributed to the resolution of the British government not to abandon its ally. All I shall now say is, that the demand was unreasonable for either party to make. But let me not be misunderstood. I do not mean to say, nor do I think, that peace was at all attainable; and from the time that the first propositions arrived from Erfurth, I was uniformly of this opinion. If the Uti possidetis was proposed as a basis of negociation, such a basis was, under all the circumstances, most absurd; for at that very time, it implied, that we should retain possession of Portugal, of which we were then in possession, and that Buonaparté embargo be taken off, but the American | should keep those provinces which were government would, in the case of France refusing to follow your example, have made common cause with you against the ❘ common enemy. And you have rejected all the advantages of commerce, peace and alliance, rather than retract an act of injustice of which you have been guilty! This is a subject which merits the serious consideration of the House, and though it is not mentioned in the Speech, it is of such importance, that an ample and full discussion of it in the course of the session you will find unavoidable; but as it is not my intention to move any amendment to the Address, I shall not at present press it farther upon the attention of your lordships. There is really, my lords, very little of the Address in which I can concur. And I cannot omit the present opportunity of entering my protest, in particular, against that part of it which thanks his Majesty for renewing his engagements with the Spanish government, for to this hour I did not know that any engagements did exist. I was willing to give ministers credit for at least avoiding, in the present precarious situation of Spain, to tie themselves down by any stipulations, by which our policy might in future be embarrassed. It is therefore with the most poignant grief that I find, not only that such engagements No occupied by his army. Peace, therefore, |