that a vast majority of the intelligence and property of the country do practically repose their hopes of tranquillity and order on the experienced firmness and prudence of his personal character; and of this class a great number, perhaps the majority, in their hearts prefer him as a locum tenens, till circumstances may permit the legitimate succession of Henry V. But as a real poll by universal suffrage could be in fact nothing else but an uncontrollable popular insurrection, the numerical majority would depend upon the whim and passion of the moment. It might have been for Louis Philippe, if the election had occurred just after his gallant conduct in the Fieschi slaughter; at any other period the majority would be against the Government merely because it was a government; and as the Buonapartes are essentially the enemies of all legitimate authority, it is possible some one of them might be elected, and-until he had published this foolish book-we should have thought that Lucien might be the favourite.

This brings us to the third and last object, which we conceive Lucien may have had-that of conciliating different parties to his future accession to power; but, as generally happens in such cases, we think his efforts to conciliate contradictory opinions likely to have the effect of offending all. In the first place, he abjures all his early revolutionary principles, except only that of the exercise of the sovereignty of the people by electing, once for all, the chief magistrate by universal suffrage. This last clause will not win the friends either of the real or the quasi legitimacy. Next, he is an advocate for two chambers one of them consisting of an hereditary aristocracy. This will be well received by the present peers for life, and generally by the whole aristocracy, whether of birth or wealth-but will dissatisfy all the republicans;-while on the other hand, his advancing the irresistible political rights and power of the proletaires, or working class, will indispose every real friend of good order. And finally, his profession of belief in the Gospel, and of respect and devotion for what he is pleased to call the religion of all Frenchmen,-(p. 41) and his— ay, Lucien Buonaparte's-canonization of Madame Elizabeth as a saint, will appear to one half of the nation an indecent persiflage, and to the other hypocritical jargon.

Nor will his foreign politics be more generally acceptable. His adulation of England, and his moderation towards the other great powers, will not conciliate them to a Buonaparte, while it will move the bile of all true Frenchmen-whose hatred of England is not mitigated by the contempt which they feel for her present government; and whose jealousy of the great continental powers is only increased by their apprehensions. When he says that the name of the house of Orange is inseparable from the glory and

liberty

liberty of the Batavian people,' the proposition is true, and might afford a convenient basis for the policy of a new French dynasty; but how will it please the political fanatics in France and Belgium, whose hatred for legitimate royalty--and that only-placed Leopold on the throne?

In short, look which way we will, we cannot discover what any man of ordinary experience or common sense could, in Lucien Buonaparte's position, have proposed to himself from this publi

cation.

A recent event may give rise to a new conjecture, to which we must allude-namely, that this publication was a forerunner of the Strasbourg affair. But it is, in our opinion, impossible that this literary movement on Lucien's part can have had any connexion with the insurrectionary movement of his nephew Louis-for in the first place, Lucien, when he talks of a Sovereignty to be created by universal suffrage,' probably believes, as we once did, that of all the Buonapartes he would be the likeliest pretender, and if the hereditary principle is to have any effect, he is not a man to resign his pretensions to the sons of his younger brother.* Besides, there has always, we believe, been a sort of hereditary animosity between Lucien and these Beauharnais-Buonapartes-not diminished by Napoleon's adoption of them, and his avowed design to have called them, if he had not had a son of his own, to the succession of the empire. But it is remarkable that, about three months ago, a most eulogistic memoir of this young Louis Napoleon was printed in a pamphlet and assiduously circulated in Paris-a proceeding which has been suspected by those best acquainted with French politics to have had some connexion with the late attempt, and to have been, at least, a kind of candidature on Louis' part for the imperial seat. In such a pretension Lucien, of course, could not concur; and is it not possible that he may have determined to publish his Memoirs by way of a counterpoise to those of his ambitious nephew? We, in short, acquit, in our own mind, Lucien of any participation in the attempt of Louis, which, if at all foreseen, we think it much. more probable that these Memoirs were intended to anticipate and defeat.

On the subject of that attempt, which naturally connects itself with the question we have been discussing, we shall add a few words. It is commonly said that a conspiracy defeated strengthens the government against which it was directed. That may be true of legitimate and well-established governments; but it is, we

In his pamphlet of last year, indeed, he seemed disposed to insist on the rights of Joseph as the head of the family-but Joseph has no son ;-after all, he only spoke of poor Joseph with reference to the question of a Buonaparte Regency in 1815.

think, the reverse with a government sprung from a revolution, and having-as Lucien justly describes that of Louis Philippeno basis whatsoever. He has no right but possession, and no hold but by the sword. Towards the consolidation of such a power, the first necessary is quiet-the new edifice wants time to settle and dry-every year that should pass without an attempt at revolution would strengthen the joints and knit the cement; while on the contrary, these continual commotions have not only the effect of shaking and disturbing the existing government-but the still worse effect of necessitating such severe-and from a government sprung out of an émeute-such inconsistent and extraordinary measures, as increase its unpopularity and its ultimate danger. Should this system continue, the monarchy of Louis Philippe-if even there were no other cause-must at length break down under the odium of the succession of restrictive laws and penal inflictions, which these monthly insurrections force upon him. How can a people, pretending to liberty or even to social civilization, bear, we will not say the indignity, but even the inconveniences of such a system of suspicion and surveillance, as now spreads itself, like Vulcan's net, heavy though invisible, over the face of France? Necessary it is, and therefore justifiable, pro re nata; but if it is to be continued, it will-however justifiablebecome intolerable.

Besides, the beneficial effect of the repression of such attempts is mainly by intimidation; but we doubt whether, in a revolutionary state of society-such as, unhappily, that of France has been since the days of July-the punishment of political criminals does not produce emulation rather than intimidation. Fieschi's fate, if it did not excite, at least did not discourage Alibaud. The scaffold was still hot with Alibaud's blood when the conspiracy of the Rue de l'Oursine was formed; the sentence of these men is scarcely pronounced, when we have the higher and bolder treason of Strasbourg and Vendôme, attempted by such contemptible men and such miserable means as, in a wholesome state of society, would hardly have ventured to rob a diligence. Nor can it operate much in the way of intimidation to see that Louis Philippe will not and, for his head, dare not punish the leader of this audacious treason.* Alas! for Louis Philippe and for France.

*We doubt, indeed, whether there would not have been found legal difficulties in the way of a trial for high treason of this, or any other Buonaparte-who, by the special law which exiles them, seem deprived of the rights, and, of course, released from the allegiance of French citizens. For the infraction of that law they might be tried; but it applies, we believe, no specific penalty. The Strasbourg adventurer's case is, in principle, not different from those of the Duchess of Berry, and of Napoleon on his return from Elba. But these are niceties which the tetes exaltées of France will not unravel-the impunity of Emperor Louis-Napoleon will be taken for a confession of weakness, and the punishment of his associates (if it takes place) will be called injustice and cruelty-a new dilemma for King Louis-Philippe.

We

We pity him-we grieve for her. They are both now paying, and will have still more grievously to pay, the hard price of their compliances with the revolutionary fraud of July. She conferred the crown by means which nullified the gift, and he accepted it on terms under which it is impossible to wear it. He has since the fatal day that he accepted the poisoned mantle-acted with, we think, almost unexceptionable propriety; he has been, in their proper occasions, severe without cruelty, discreet without weakness, and brave without rashness. He has done all that a man ought to do, and more than we thought any man could have done, in the most difficult position in which he has been placed; but the inherent and unconquerable defect of his original title defeats his good intentions, embitters his private life, and disturbs and endangers, on the slightest occasions, the very foundations of social order. It is not the Buonapartes that are to be feared. The fop Louis with his little hat-the proser Lucien with his universal suffrage,' are contemptible in themselves; but it is a fearful thing. to see a state of society so morbid as to be disturbed or endangered by such miserable pretensions.

We cannot conclude this painful subject without making a special observation on the affair at Vendôme, which exhibits one of the most curious coincidences, and one of the most striking examples of retributive justice that we have almost ever seen. Our readers know that an attempt was made, simultaneously with the Strasbourg affair, to seduce from their allegiance the regiment of the Hussards d'Orleans quartered at Vendôme, with a view to the overthrow of the dynasty of July. If our readers will look back to the personal journal of Louis Philippe, translated in a former Number of our Review (vol. lii. p. 551), they will see that Louis Philippe, while commanding in that very same garrison of Vendome a regiment of Hussars, distinguished, we believe, by the same patronymic title, attempted, and too successfully, to seduce the regiment from its allegiance to the king. I could not tolerate, he then patriotically exclaimed, any one who preferred QUELQU'UN (the king Louis XVI.)—to their country.' We wonder how he will now deal with the officer who, in the same

• Of course our readers will understand that we are here speaking of Louis Philippe as first magistrate of France. We are well aware that in the recesses of his character there are many very unamiable and some not very reputable qualities, of which his conduct, both public and private, from the restoration in 1814 up to the émeute of June, 1832-when he really became King of France-affords but too many instances. We know, from a person who has kindly communicated to us a note which he made of the conversation, that Louis XVIII., speaking of Louis Philippe to an illustrious foreigner, in the presence of his brother (Charles X.), said, that EGALITE etait un meilleur homme que son fils,'-an opinion which Charles warmly contested, and endeavoured to disprove by insisting on certain good points of Louis Philippe's character!-Eheu!

place,

place, and with the same regiment, and with the same design, only imitated his own patriotic example; he will, we are well assured—whatever else he may do-draw no such nice distinctions between that royal QUELQU'UN—the king—and the country which owes him allegiance.*

ART. VII.-1. Report from the Committee on the Bill to regulate the Labour of Children in the Mills, &c. &c. Folio. 1832. 2. Reports of Factory Commissioners. Folio. 1833, 1834. 3. Reports and Evidence of the Parliamentary Committees on the Factory Question. Folio. 1832.

4. The Curse of the Factory System. By John Fielden, M.P. for Oldham, and Manufacturer at Todmorden, in Lancashire. 1836. 5. Factory Statistics. The Official Tables appended to the Report of the Select Committee on the Ten-Hours Factory Bill, Vindicated in a Series of Letters addressed to John Elliot Drinkwater, Esq. By the late M. T. Sadler, Esq. 1836.

6. An Inquiry into the State of the Manufacturing Population, and the Causes and Cures of the Evils therein Existing. 1881. 7. The Moral and Physical Condition of the Working Classes Employed in the Cotton Manufacture in Manchester. By James Phillips Kay, M.D. 1832.

8. The Evils of the Factory System. By Charles Wing, Member of the Royal College of Surgeons, and one of the Surgeons to the Royal Metropolitan Hospital for Children. London, 8vo. 1836.

9. A Voice from the Factories. 8vo. 1836.

ALTHOUGH several years have elapsed since we last urged

attention to the manufacturing system, we have not been indifferent to the progress of it. We have seen, with dismay, the opening fulfilment of our predictions; we have anxiously observed the efforts of a zealous few to mitigate the evil; an evil which, if not speedily checked, threatens to corrupt the whole social system of those vast counties, and bring into jeopardy, certainly the honour, and perhaps the safety, of the empire.

These

The translation of Lucien's book, made, as we are pompously told, 'under the immediate superintendence of the author,' is the worst we have ever met-so bad, indeed, as to be in some instances absolutely unintelligible, and to have required, in the passages we have extracted, many idiomatic corrections. M. Lucien can have no great aptitude for learning languages, if, after a residence of half his life in countries where English is the vernacular tongue, this strange version has been made under his immediate superintendence. We shall give a few examples of a degree of slip-slop ignorance that would otherwise be almost incredible :

The young Robespierre had evinced much esteem towards General Bonaparte: and that was sufficient to cause him to be proscribed; arrested upon imputations the

most