1819. Sturges V. Crowninshield. that if Congress exercise this power, the States are devested of it. But what species of power is this? Laws made by independent legislatures, expire by their own limitation, or are repealed by the authority which enacted them. Here, however, is a novel method of destroying laws. They are not repealed; do not cease by their own limitation; but are suspended by the interference of another independent legislature. It is difficult, upon this construction, to define this power of the States. 2. The act of the State of New-York, pleaded in this cause, is a bankrupt law within the meaning of the constitution of the United States. By this law, on the application of any person imprisoned or prosecuted for a debt; or, on the application of any creditor of a debtor imprisoned, or against whom an execution against his goods and chattels hath been re monwealth, with a view to the relief of an unfortunate class of debtors from existing embarrassments, that the object of the framers of the constitution, in this prohibition upon the States, was to prevent tender laws and other expedients of a like nature, which had been resorted to in some of the States, to the great prejudice of creditors; and that this article of the constitution ought to be construed with reference to such intention. But the words are too imperative to be evaded. "No State shall emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts." It would be contrary to all rules of construction to limit this latter clause of the constitution to a subject which is expressly prohibited in a preceding sentence. Full operation ought to be given to the words of an instrument so deliberately and cautiously made as was the constitution of the United States." turned unsatisfied, he having sixty days notice thereof, proceedings may be had before certain tribunals by the act established, whereby all his property may be taken and divided among his creditors, and he liberated from imprisonment, and discharged from all debts. It will be insisted, in support of the plea, that this law is an insolvent law. What is an insolvent law? Insolvent laws are derived from the cessio bonorum of the Roman law, and discharge the person, and not the future acquisitions of the debtor. A judgment, assignment, or cession, under that law, does not extinguish the right of action; it has no other effect than to release from imprisonment. A bankrupt law establishes a system for a complete discharge of insolvent debtors. An insolvent law is an act occasionably passed for the relief of the body of the debtor. A bankrupt law, as distinguished from an insolvent law, is a general law, by which all the property of the debtor is taken and divided among his creditors, and he discharged from his debts, and made, as it is sometimes said, a new man. But if this be not a bankrupt law, then it may remain in force if Congress should exercise its power. Would then the laws on the subject of bankruptcy be uniform? It is impossible to believe, that the Convention meditated such an absurdity. On this point the cases are numerous and strong. In Golden v. Prince," the law of Pennsylvania, which was similar to that of New-York, was treated, both by the bench and bar, as a bankrupt law. In Blanchard v. Russell," the statute now pleaded, was declared by the Supreme a 5 Hall's Law Journ. 502. VOL. IV. 17 b 13 Mass. Rep. 1. 1819. Sturges v. Crownin shield. 1819. Sturges V. Crowninshield. Court of Massachusetts, to be a bankrupt law. In Smith v. Buchanan," the law of Maryland was so considered by the English Court of K. B. In Proctor v. Moore,' a special act of the legislature of Connecticut, is considered as a bankrupt law by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. In the case of Blanchard v. Russell, Mr. Chief Justice Parker says, speaking of the statute now in question, "The law under which the debtor claims to be discharged, is a general law, intended to affect all the citizens of the State of New-York, at least, and it provides a system by which an insolvent debtor may, upon his own application, or upon petition of any of his creditors, be holden to surrender all his property, and be discharged from all his debts. It is, therefore, a bankrupt law, and to be distinguished from insolvent laws, technically so called." But this is said not to be a bankrupt law, because such laws apply only to traders, and this embraces every debtor. The first English bankrupt statute, that of Henry VIII. c. 1. makes a general provision; and this is declared to be the foundation of the whole system. It is true, by various subsequent statutes, it was limited; but the construction now given to those statutes embraces various descriptions of persons, who are not merchants or traders. It is not, therefore, an essential feature of a law on the subject of bankruptcies that it should extend to traders only. It is further urged, that by the English bankrupt laws, an act of bankruptcy devests the debtor of his property, and the proceedings always originate with the creditor. By the 16th section of the law under consideration, the creditor may originate proceedings, under certain circumstances; and all grants and dispositions of property made after a certain time are declared void. What constitutes this, and other similar laws, bankrupt laws, is, that thereby an absolute discharge of the body of the debtor and his future acquisitions of property is obtained. In this it differs from insolvent laws. 3. This act is a law impairing the obligation of contracts, and, therefore, unconstitutional and void. A contract is an agreement to do, or not to do, a particular thing. Its obligation binds the parties to do, or not to do, the thing agreed to be done, or not done, and in the manner stipulated. Whatever relieves either party from the performance of the contract in whole or in part, impairs its obligation. It is, however, said, that if the contract is made in the State where such law exists, the parties have reference to it, and it is a part of their contract. This is a petitio principii. If the act be unconstitutional and void, the parties regarded it as such, and, of course, did not look to it as binding. A law, declaring that debtors might be discharged on paying half the sum due, or that the creditor might recover double the sum due, are alike void; or else, all contracts are at the mercy of the Legislature. Legislatures act within the limits of their powers, only when they establish laws to enable parties to enforce contracts; laws to afford redress to the injured against negligence and fraud in not performing engagements: and 1819. Sturges V. Crownin shield: 1819. Sturges V. Crownin Courts act within their proper sphere, when they confine themselves to the exposition of those contracts, and giving efficacy to the laws. shield. 4. But even admitting this act to be constitutional as to all contracts made after it was passed, it was clearly unconstitutional and void as to all contracts then existing, as it was an act or law impairing their obligation. The first impression of any man, learned or unlearned, is, that a law which discharges a contract, without an entire performance of it, impairs its obligation. A law which declares, that a bond given for the payment of 1000 dollars may be cancelled, and the obligor freed from all liability to suit thereon, upon the payment of 500 dollars, certainly materially affects the obligation of the contract, and impairs it. It will be urged, however, that though the words in the constitution are broad enough to include the case, yet they are to be con▾ strued according to the intent of the framers, and that the prohibition of such laws as that in question was not intended by the constitution. Surely, language here, as every where else, is to be understood according to its import. If by a law impairing the obligation of contracts, we are not necessarily to understand a law relieving either of the contracting parties from the performance of any part, or the whole of the stipulations, into which he has entered, we ask for a definition of such law. In the case before the Court, it appears, that the defendant, in March, 1811, in New-York, gave to the plaintiff his promissory note, payable in August, 1811, for 771 dollars, and 86 cents. In April, 1811, the law under consideration was 1 |