1819. Miller Nicholls. struction of the act of Congress, or that it was drawn into question. It is sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction of the cause, that the record should show that an act of Congress was applicable to the case. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. The case agreed in the Court below, stated, that William Nicholls, collector, &c. being indebted to the United States of America, on the 9th of June, 1798, executed a mortgage to Henry Miller, for the use of the United States, in the sum of 59,444 dollars, conditioned for the payment of 29,271 dollars, payable, 9,757 dollars on or before the 1st of January, 1799; 9,757 dollars on or before the 9th of June, 1799; and 9,757 dollars on or before the 9th of September, 1799. A scire facias was issued upon the said mortgage, returnable to September term of the said Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in the year 1800, and judgment thereupon entered up, in the said Supreme Court, on the 6th of March, 1802, and thereupon a levari facias issued, and was levied upon the property of the said William Nicholls, and the same being sold to the highest bidder, for the sum of 14,530 dollars, the same was brought into Court, and is now deposited in the hands of the prothonotary of said Court, subject to the orders of the same Court. That, on the 22d of December, 1797, the accounts of the said William Nicholls with the commonwealth of Pennsylvania were settled by the Comptroller and Register General of the Commonwealth. (Prout account and settlement.) That an appeal from said settlement was filed in the office of the prothonotary of the said Supreme Court, on the 6th day of March, 1798, and judgment thereupon entered in favour of the commonwealth against the said William Nicholls, in the said Supreme Court, on the 6th of September, 1798, for the sum of 9,987 dollars and 15 cents. Upon the preceding statement, the following question is submitted to the consideration of the Court: Whether the said settlement of the said public accounts of the said William Nicholls, as aforesaid, on the 22d of December, 1797, was, and is, a lien, from the date thereof, upon the real estate of the said William Nicholls, and which has since been sold as aforesaid. A. J. DALLAS, for the United States. December 2d, 1803. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on the 21st of March, 1805, on motion of Mr. M'Kean, Attorney General of the said Commonwealth, made a rule on the plaintiff in error, to show cause why the amount of the debt due to the said Commonwealth should not be taken out of Court. And on the 22d of March, 1805, Alexander James Dallas, the Attorney of the United States for the district of Pennsylvania, came into Court and suggested, "that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ought not to be permitted to have and receive the money levied and produced by virtue of the execution in the suit, because the said 1819. Miller V. Nicholls: 1819. Miller V. Nicholls. March 9th. Attorney, on behalf of the United States, saith, that as well by virtue of the said execution, as of divers acts of Congress, and particularly of an act of Congress, entitled' an act to provide more effectually for the settlement of accounts between the United States and receivers of public moneys,' approved the 3d of March, 1797, the said United States are entitled to have and receive the money aforesaid, and not the said Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. A. J. DALLAS.” The record then proceeds as follows: "And now, to wit, this 13th day of September, 1805, the motion of the Attorney General, to take the money out of Court, was granted by the unanimous opinion of the Court." The proceedings were afterwards brought before this Court by writ of error. Mr. Sergeant, for the defendant in error, moved to dismiss the writ of error in this cause, for want of jurisdiction, under the judiciary act of the 24th of September, 1789, c. 20. s. 25. ; it no where appearing upon the face of the record, that any question arose respecting the validity of any treaty or statute of the United States, or of any statute of the State, upon the ground of its repugnancy to the constitution or laws of the United States." The Attorney General, contra. a Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304. Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. The question decided in the Supreme Court for the State of Pennsylvania respected only the construction of a law of that State. It does not appear, from the record, that either the constitutionality of the law of Pennsylvania, or any act of Congress was drawn into question. It would not be required, that the record should, in terms, state a misconstruction of an act of Congress, or that an act of Congress was drawn into question. It would have been sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction of the cause, that the record should show that an act of Congress was applicable to the case. That is not shown by this record. The act of Congress which is supposed to have been disregarded, and which, probably, was disregarded by the State Court, is that which gives the United States priority in cases of insolvency. Had the fact of insolvency appeared upon the record, that would have enabled this Court to revise the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. But that fact does not appear. No other question is presented, than the correctness of the decision of the State Court, according to the laws of Pennsylvania, and that is a question over which this Court can take no jurisdiction. The writ of error must be dismissed. Writ of error dismissed. 1819. Miller V. Nicholls, 1819. M'Culloch V. State of Ma ryland. (CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.) M'CULLOCH v. The STATE OF MARYLAND et al. Congress has power to incorporate a Bank. The government of the Union is a government of the People; it emanates from them; its powers are granted by them; and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit. The government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action; and its laws, when made in pursuance of the constitution, form the supreme law of the land. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States, similar to the articles of Confederation, which exclude incidental or implied powers. If the end be legitimate, and within the scope of the constitution, all the means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited, may constitutionally be employed to carry it into effect. The power of establishing a corporation is not a distinct sovereign power or end of government, but only the means of carrying inte effect other powers which are sovereign. Whenever it becomes an appropriate means of exercising any of the powers given by the constitution to the government of the Union, it may be exercised by that government. If a certain means to carry into effect any of the powers, expressly given by the constitution to the government of the Union, be an appropiate measure, not prohibited by the constitution, the degree of its necessity is a question of legislative discretion, not of judicial cognizance. The act of the 10th April, 1816, c. 44., to "incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," is a law made in pursuance of the constitution. The Bank of the United States has, constitutionally, a right to establish its branches or offices of discount and deposit within any State. The State, within which such branch may be established, cannot, without violating the constitution, tax that branch. The State governments have no right to tax any of the constitutional means employed by the goverment of the Union to execute its constitutional powers. |