400 MAJOR-GEN. SIR J. KEANE'S JOURNAL OF MAY, 1815. enemy to oblique the fire of his flanks sufficiently to enable his injuring the columns from his whole front when close up to his works. "When the position is carried, the flank battalions to press the enemy's rear for half a mile, or the receipt of instructions. A detachment of sappers to accompany each column. "The advance guard is to carry forward with it six long ladders with planks on them, and ten small ladders as well as the fascines. The officer commanding the 44th regiment must ascertain where these requisites are this evening, so as there may be no delay in taking them forward to-morrow morning to the old batteries. 86 'When the advance has taken up its ground and placed a few sentries, the piquets should join their corps. "The flank battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Renny will carry the outwork battery on the enemy's right, and spike the guns." When dark, on the evening of the 7th, the boats commenced passing into the river. A dam had been thrown across below the sternmost boat, which raised the water 2 feet: still there was a very considerable fall from the river, and through which (an extent of 200 yards) the boats were with incredible labour dragged by the seamen. It required the whole night to accomplish this, and the day had dawned before the first part of Colonel Thornton's command, 500 men, had embarked; and they had just reached the opposite bank as the main attack commenced on the enemy's line. The troops advanced as ordered. The light brigade, under LieutenantColonel Renny, gained the work on the enemy's right; but not being supported, they were overpowered, and in a few minutes scarcely a man remained alive. The 93rd regiment was originally intended to support Colonel Renny, but an order received during the advance placed it too far to the right. The ditch in front of Major-General Keane's column was found to be impassable. The 93rd regiment suffered most severely on this occasion. In the main attack by the 2nd brigade under General Gibbs, the 44th regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Mullens, advanced without the fascines, &c. The 21st regiment, which followed in support, on being exposed to the fire on the verge of the ditch, wavered, broke its chain of communica tion, commenced firing, and finally gave way, throwing the 4th regiment into confusion, and leaving its two leading companies, under Brevet-Major M'Haffir, in the enemy's ditch, who were of course made prisoners. It was in the endeavour to command obedience and conduct from these troops that our noble commander of the forces exposed himself and received two dreadful wounds, the second mortal. Major-General Gibbs was also mortally wounded about the same time, and Major-General Keane on the left severely so. The attack having failed, the troops were recalled under cover of the artillery. The cannonade continued till nine o'clock, when the firing ceased on both sides. Our loss on this memorable morning was 2030 in killed, wounded, and missing. Having thus detailed the events of the 17 days which the army has been employed upon this coast, it is a justice due to it to revert to the difficulties it had to surmount. The first and most serious appears - the distance we were removed from our supplies, above 60 miles, in an intricate and uncertain navigation. A second was the absolute impossibility of gaining intelligence. The inhabitants had abandoned their houses, and not a single deserter came over MAY, 1815. THE OPERATIONS AGAINST NEW ORLEANS. 401 to us. The information of the prisoners was vague and contradictory, that of the negroes trifling and unsatisfactory. The nature of the soil rendered our operations uncertain, and dependent entirely on the weather. Fortunately it was in general moderate, otherwise little of what was done could have been attempted. The enemy, long before our appearance on the coast, had been apprised of our intended operations (vide the following extract). He was therefore fully prepared. Extract from a Proclamation published by Major Nicholls of the Marines serving with the Indians, by order of Sir Alexander Cochrane, dated Pensacola, in August or September last. A powerful reinforcement is on its way here, and I hope to prepare for the Americans some employment very different from that of oppressing the inhabitants of Louisiana." Our extreme want of boats and small vessels rendered it impossible to land more than 2000 men at one time, and it became an act, if not of necessity, of prudence, to wait the remainder, as well as some part of our artillery, ere we could have advanced any distance. The enemy's line was short, strongly flanked, and not possible to be turned. The flank fire from his floating batteries exposed us to severe loss whenever we advanced beyond the protection of our own guns. The population of the country, which we had been led to expect would receive us, if not with open arms, at least with an aspect of neutrality, formed the greater part of the force opposed to us; and from letters and documents found in their houses, bore us as little goodwill as the people who were at the moment ruling them with martial law, and forcing them to carry arms with a degree of tyranny not excelled by the conscription. II. Copy of a Letter from General Jackson to the Secretary at War, dated Camp below New Orleans, 9th Jan., 1815. SIR, During the days of the 6th and 7th the enemy had been employed in making preparations for an attack upon my lines. With infinite labour they had succeeded in the night of the 7th in getting their boats across from the lake to the river by widening the canal, by which they had effected their disembarkation. It had not been in my power to impede these operations by a general attack. Added to other reasons, the nature of the troops under my command, mostly militia, rendered it too hazardous to attempt extensive offensive movements in an open country against a numerous and well-disciplined army. Although my forces, as to number, had been increased by the arrival of the Kentucky division, my strength had received very little addition, as only a small portion of that detachment were provided with arms. Compelled thus to wait the attack of the enemy, I took every measure to repel it when it should be made, and to defeat the object he had in view. General Morgan with the Orleans contingent, the Louisiana militia, and a strong detachment of the Kentucky troops, occupied an intrenched camp at the opposite side of the river, protected by strong batteries on the bank, erected by Commodore Patterson. In my encampment everything was ready for action, when early on the morning of the 8th the enemy, after throwing a VOL. X. 2 D 402 OPERATIONS AGAINST NEW ORLEANS. MAY, 1815. heavy shower of bombs and Congreve rockets, advanced their columns on the right and left to storm my intrenchments. I cannot speak sufficiently in praise of the firmness and deliberation with which my whole line received their approach. More could not have been expected from veterans inured to war. For an hour the fire of small arms was as incessant and severe as can be imagined. The artillery, too, directed by officers who displayed equal skill and courage, did great execution. Yet the columns of the enemy continued to advance with a firmness which reflects upon them the greatest credit. Twice the column which approached my left was repulsed by the troops of General Carroll, those of General Coffee, and a division of the Kentucky militia; and twice they formed again and renewed the assault. At length, however, cut to pieces, they fled in confusion from the field, leaving it covered with their dead and wounded. The loss which the enemy sustained on this occasion cannot be estimated at less than 1500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Upwards of 300 have already been given over for burial, and my men are still engaged in picking them up within my lines and carrying them to the point where the enemy are to receive them. This is in addition to the dead and wounded whom the enemy have been enabled to carry from the field during and since the action, and to those who have since died of wounds they received. We have taken about 500 prisoners, 300 of whom are wounded, and a great part of them mortally. My loss has not exceeded, and I believe has not amounted to, ten killed, and as many wounded. The entire destruction of the enemy's army was inevitable, had it not been for an unfortunate occurrence which at this moment took place on the other side of the river. Simultaneously with his advance upon my lines, he had thrown over in his boats a considerable force to the right bank. These having landed, were hardy enough to advance against the works of General Morgan; and what is strange and difficult to account for, at the very moment when their entire discomfiture was looked for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the Kentucky reinforcements, on whom so much reliance had been placed, ingloriously fled, drawing after them, by their example, the remainder of the forces, and thus yielding to the enemy that most formidable position. The batteries which for many days had rendered me the most important services, though bravely defended, were of course now abandoned, not, however, until the guns were spiked. This unfortunate rout had totally changed the aspect of affairs the enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been able to defeat, in a great measure, the effect of our services on this side the river. It became, therefore, an object of the first consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible. For this object all the means in my power, which I could with safety use, were immediately put in preparation. Perhaps it was owing somewhat to another cause that I succeeded even beyond my expectations. In negotiating the terms of a temporary suspension of hostilities to enable the enemy to bury their dead and provide for their wounded, I had required certain propositions to be acceded to as a basis, among which this was one, "That although hostilities should cease on this side the river until twelve o'clock this day, yet it was not to be understood that they should cease on the other side, but that no reinforcements should be sent across by either army until the expiration of that hour." His Excellency Major-General Lambert begged time to consider of these propositions until ten o'clock, and in the mean time recrossed his troops. I need not tell you with how much eagerness I immediately regained possession of the position he had thus happily quitted. The enemy having concentrated his forces, may again attempt to drive me CONVENTION FOR SUBSISTING THE ALLIED ARMIES. 403 from my position by storm. Whenever he does, I have no doubt my men will act with their usual firmness, and sustain a character now become dear to them. ANDREW JACKSON, Major-General Commanding. MEMORANDA. [882.] June, 1815. The Powers of Europe having agreed, by the Treaty of General Alliance, of the 25th March last, that a separate convention should be entered into for the purpose of regulating the subsistence of the armies; and it being expedient that the stipulations of that convention should be made applicable to the situation in which the Allied armies will find themselves within the French territory, they have named * to discuss, settle, and arrange the terms of the said convention. ART. 1. The countries within the French frontier which, in the course of the operations of the war, shall fall into the hands of the Allies, shall be made over to the officers to be appointed by His Majesty Louis XVIII., who shall govern them under His Majesty's instructions according to the laws and constitution of France. ART. 2. These officers shall receive and draw from them all the resources which they can afford for the prosecution of the war and the attainment of the just object the Allies have in view. ART. 3. All requisitions for subsistence, &c. &c., on the country shall be made by the officers to be appointed by His Majesty Louis XVIII.; and with this view His Majesty is requested to appoint a sufficient number of commissaries or other officers to reside at the head-quarters of the several armies, in order to receive the requisitions of the officers at the head of their several contingents, and to have them executed in the country, and to see that those who supply them receive proper vouchers and receipts. ART. 4. A stipulation to the same effect as the note attached to our ratification. WELLINGTON. * Blank in manuscript. 404 ADVANCES ON ACCOUNT OF SUBSIDIES. JUNE, 1815. MEMOIR by the COMPTROLLERS respecting the SUBSIDIES to the THREE GREAT POWERS. From Mr. ROSENHAGEN. June, 1815. It is proposed that the subsidies to be given to the Three Great Powers be fixed in a foreign currency, with an option to Great Britain to pay them in certain coins, the value of which in such foreign currency may be at once agreed upon. French money (francs) appears to be the most proper for the basis of the agreement, because it is the most current in the theatre of war, whether France or the Netherlands, and because it is probable that the payments will be most easily effected in French gold and silver coin. If 5,000,000. sterling are to be given to the Three 120,000,000 Great Powers, the amount in French money, at Francs. This sum, then, the British government might bind itself to supply to Austria, Russia, and Prussia respectively, at such places as might be agreed upon, taking upon herself the chances of any variations in the exchanges, and reserving to herself (although with the desire of affording therein every convenience in her power to the Allies) the option of paying it in French money, or in the following coins, at the rates affixed to each : Dutch guilders, and other Dutch money, at 11 guilders .. 24 In order to facilitate the first operations of the Allies, it will probably be considered very essential that some advances should at once be made to them. It would be impossible, considering the demands for specie for our own army, to make them such advances immediately in money; and it would have the worst effect upon our exchanges if we were to give them bills upon England, or allow them to draw upon this country. It is therefore suggested that for such immediate advances bills upon Hamburg and upon Amsterdam should be furnished to them, at three months' date, which we should thereby have time to provide for by means which would less hurt our exchanges with the Continent than any negotiations on their part. Bills for 600,000l. (200,000l. to each Power) of this description could be furnished immediately. |