APRIL, 1815. MEASURES OF BUONAPARTE. 29 fait." What may appear more surprising is, that the troops are by no means as satisfied as their infamous conduct would make it appear. They were quite astonished at the cold and silent reception they met with from the Parisians: many of the soldiers say aloud, "Nous croyions que la nation seroit contente de ce que nous avons fait, mais puisqu'il en est autrement nous pourrons défaire ce que nous avons fait." Two regiments of cuirassiers refused the other day to cry "Vive l'Empereur !" and it is an absolute fact that many soldiers have already deserted. As numbers of them are lodged by billet in private houses, I have heard them say, "Nous aimons mieux le Père la Violette [Buonaparte] que le gros Papa [le Roi] que nous ne connoissons pas, mais nous sommes las de guerre, et s'il faut pour cela nous battre avec toute l'Europe, nous reprendrons le gros Papa." The Old Guard, which has come from Metz to Paris, is extremely discontented. They thought Buonaparte would give them still more than what the King had promised them; but finding the contrary, many of them said aloud, if they had known that, they would have fought for the King. Their behaviour was so mutinous that Buonaparte had a moment the thought of disbanding them. The French army is now what the Roman legions were under Galbus. Nineteen Colonels have given in their "démissions," and Macdonald and Oudinot have declared they will not serve. Oudinot's letter to Buonaparte is that of an honest man : Sire, je resterai à Metz tant que le Roi sera en France; aussitôt qu'il quittera le sol Français, je m'en irai chez moi, et arrachant mes épaulettes je m'estimerai plus heureux de vivre dans la retraite avec honneur que de rester Maréchal de France parjure." His aide-de-camp assured a friend of mine that he had delivered this letter to Buonaparte. The opinion of several people I know in the present French council of state is that Buonaparte cannot remain six months Emperor. The greater part of his ministry, which his present weakness has obliged him to compose against his will, is against him. Fouché, Carnot, all the old Jacobins now grown rich, and all the partisans of liberal ideas, know him too well to put any confidence in him, and look up secretly to the Duke of Orleans. Luckily, notwithstanding his new pretended love of liberty, and the hum of his abolition of the slave trade which he hopes will give him partisans in England, the violence of his character has already broken out, and occasioned a very serious discussion between him and his new ministry. After having declared the liberty of the press, he has named Etienne secret censor of all the newspapers, and not an article can be inserted without the permission of that fellow. The next day, as a proof of his respect for personal liberty, he exiled twenty-five persons, the greater part of whom are most respectable judges and members of his council of state, who refused to sign the late addresses presented to him. This measure has done him more harm than if he had exiled a hundred old nobles. He has besides sequestered the estates of all the members of the provisory government, and of several officers of the King's household who have remained in France. The day before I left Paris it was a general report he had given orders to arrest all the officers of the Maison du Roi, and I know several of them who went away secretly. The best informed people about his government think that as soon as the Congress declares war (which by the way should be done as soon as possible) he will endeavour to organise the Jacobinism of 1793, 30 STATE OF THE FRENCH PROVINCES. APRIL, 1815. hoping by that means to crush the rich Jacobin party of Fouché, &c.; and if he succeeds by revolutionary measures in preventing his being dethroned, he will then crush the sansculottes Jacobins by the army and establish a pure military despotism. I can at least give assurance as a fact, that he has had a long conversation with Real on the manner the clubs and revolutionary committees were organised in 1793. But he will not be more able to revive the Jacobinism of 1793 than the Royalists the Vendée of the same year. The low class of people have learned by long experience that they will gain nothing by new revolutions. However, Buonaparte will either get rid one way or other of the Fouché and Carnot party, or, which is as probable, he will be assassinated by them. In this latter case it is almost certain they will tell the Allied Powers, "We have got rid of the tyrant you have put out of the pale of nations, and against whom alone you are making war: now allow us to choose a prince in the Bourbon family capable of governing us, and thus keep your word, and don't interfere with our internal government, which will offer a guarantee for the peace of Europe." It does not belong to me to judge of what the Allied Powers should do, but in my humble opinion they should declare on the onset of the war they will maintain the Treaty of Paris in every article with respect to the limits of France and the rights of the Bourbon family as then established. By that means a number of people in France who might join from fear the Orleans party, which is more considerable than your Lordship perhaps imagines, would remain faithful to the King; at the same time the silly dread the French have in general of the secret views of the Allies would be done away, and Buonaparte would find no way of making the war national. The King personally is very popular, but his ministers are by no means so, and Count de Blacas is universally execrated. With regard to the situation of the provinces in France, your Lordship knows already that all the south of France from Bordeaux to Marseilles is in arms for the King. In Provence especially the national guards are perfectly organised, and commanded by the Duke of Angoulême, who has been received at Toulon. At the same time it is evident, if the Allies don't immediately attack France, Buonaparte with 10,000 men will put an end to these Royalist dispositions in a short time. General Grouchy left Paris last Saturday to take the command of the troops who are marching against the Provençals, and General Morand is in march against Bordeaux. A few thousand English troops landed immediately at Marseilles would do more good to the House of Bourbon and to Europe than an army of 50,000 men in three months' time. The jealousy of the French would perhaps not allow the English to take possession of Toulon, and it might be wrong to attempt it at all events the English as well as the other Powers should declare they come as auxiliaries of the King of France. I was told lately in Paris by a person who ought to be well informed that the French army, which amounted to 85,000 men under Soult's ministry, is now of 125,000 men, and will be shortly of 200,000 men. I am certain that secret orders have been sent to the Prefects to execute the decrees of January, 1814, for levying 300,000 men on the anterior conscriptions and 120,000 on the conscription of 1814, besides a new conscription ordered for this year; but none of these measures will appear in the Moniteur. I know the Prefect of Rouen is gone to Paris to remonstrate against the APRIL, 1815. REPORT OF LORD HARROWBY. 31 execution of these decrees. However, if the Allies delay a few months attacking France, or, which would be the source of endless misfortunes, waited till Buonaparte attacked them, all these decrees would be executed and the Royalist party entirely crushed; whereas if the war is pushed on immediately with vigour, Buonaparte will not be able to raise men or money but in Paris and the neighbourhood, and that in a very small degree. He wants particularly arms, but even them he will have in a few months. As to his finances, I am certain that Gaudin, Duc de Gaëte, said last week that there were in the different caisses 150,000,000 of francs, of which only 40,000,000 in the treasury. This will last but a very short time, and if the Allies prevent the Royalist party being crushed, the richest provinces in France will be for the King. Buonaparte the other day wanted to raise a loan of 30,000,000 of francs on the city of Paris; but the Conseil Municipal told him it would be impossible to effect it. I have thus given you, my Lord, a short and rapid sketch of the information I obtained in Paris within this last fortnight. As an Englishman and a lover of the principles which direct the Ministry of which your Lordship is a principal member, as a friend I may say of humanity and morality, I think it my duty to communicate it to you, such as it is, though probably your Lordship may have no occasion for it, and may even think it less than useless. In case, however, any part of my letter may be deemed by your Lordship worthy attention, I shall sign my name and give my bankers' address, whom I shall see to-morrow in London, that your Lordship may not at least think this is the composition of a person who tells idle stories for his pleasure. I have the honour to be, my Lord, with great consideration, At Messrs. Coutts and Co.'s, Bankers, Strand. J. FRISSELL. The Earl of Harrowby to Viscount Castlereagh.* DEAR LORD Castlereagh, Brussels, Friday, 7th April, 1815. As you will, of course, be anxious to have the earliest intelligence from us, I take up my pen in order to send you by the messenger of this evening a very hasty and imperfect summary of the intelligence we have hitherto been able to collect, desiring that you will understand it to be such, and reserving ourselves for future corrections and additions. We arrived at Ostend on Wednesday forenoon, but were detained by want of horses till near four. We then left General Torrens behind us to take a look at the works, and reached Ghent between two and three in the morning, where we slept at Lord F. Somerset's. The next day we waited upon the King of France, who kept us an hour and a-half in conversation. Though nothing passed much worth your notice, I enclose a memorandum which we made in the chaise on our road.† Comparing it with his language to Sir C. Stuart, we were somewhat struck with two omissions of an opposite *Lord Harrowby was one of two Members of the Cabinet sent to confer with the Duke of Wellington. See p. 17. † See Memorandum C. at p. 37. 32 REPORT OF LORD HARROWBY. APRIL, 1815. tendency one, that of the proposed declaration of the Allies of their intention not to impose any form of government upon France; and the other, of the wish that their troops should mount the white cockade. We were, as became us, chiefly listeners. On leaving Ghent we again met the King on his return from his airing, and at the same moment met Monsieur and the Duc de Berri on their return from Brussels. The latter both got out of their carriage, and in our conversation on the road Monsieur told me, in a manner which implied that he had it from the Duke of Wellington, that Blücher and 80,000 Prussians were to be under his command. I only mention this to show how hastily and loosely he takes. up information. On our arrival at Brussels at ten, we went to the Duke of Wellington's, who soon came in, and learnt from him all the particulars of what had been passing at Vienna since the last despatches we had seen. We hope that his despatches, containing all this information, will have reached you before the debate on the Message, as they will enable you to hold a more decided language on many of the points which remained in doubt when we left London. This morning we have again had a long conversation with him, with both your papers of memorandums in our hands. He will write his answers to all the queries; and those answers, together with such explanations and additions as we may be enabled to furnish, will, we trust, give you all the information which can at present be collected; but, en attendant, I have left Pole and Torrens with him to talk over some points of military detail, and will endeavour to give you a short aperçu. I shall take your paper of queries as my text, and to save time, refer to them by numbers, as I conclude you have kept a copy.* 1 and 2. You will find answered in great measure by the Duke's despatches, which you have already received. He thinks the spirit and decision of the Allies perfectly good; much beyond what could have been expected, and their own; not formed in consequence of any urgency on his part, as he had always stated that we should be ready to act with them, but that it was more their business than ours, as we had shown sufficiently that we were individually equal to our own defence. The obstacles to cordial union were, or might be, our refusal to add to the Russian subsidy, a refusal which the Duke thought quite necessary. The addition was asked upon the plea of an extent of exertion and a provision for a succession of armies of reserve, which, considering the forces of the other Allies, would not be wanted. 2. The vague projects of the Emperor of Russia for the disposal of the Crown of France, which seem, however, to be quite set aside, or at least thrown into the background, by his signing a treaty which has for its object the restoration of Louis XVIII. 3. The personal ill-humour of the King of Prussia, who is certainly very sore at the decision of so many points against his wishes; but the Duke thinks all this will be set right, and that his hatred and fear of Buonaparte leave no doubt of his steadiness. 4. The points in contest between Austria and Bavaria, which are, however, on the eve of a satisfactory adjustment by the abandonment of the Austrian pretensions upon Salzburg. With respect to the amount of the subsidy, it is, of course, wished to * See Memoranda A, and B., pp. 35, 36. APRIL, 1815. REPORT OF LORD HARROWBY. 33 make it larger; but that being impossible, it had been suggested by the Duke that, leaving 1,500,000l. to each of the great Powers towards enabling them to furnish their quotas according to the treaty, the remainder might go to some of the smaller Powers, such as Bavaria and Wurtemberg, in the same proportion to the quotas which they might engage to furnish upon their accession. With respect to the division of the 6,000,000l. to cover the British contingent, we stated to the Duke the ideas entertained at home, that as about 4,000,000l. would be required for 50,000 men, to be supported entirely by Great Britain, the remainder, of about 2,100,000l., must go to assist in providing 90,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry. He does not allow that the 50,000 men can cost near so much as 801. per man, everything included; and if he can succeed in convincing the government of this, he hopes that whenever the numbers can be enlarged, it will be done. He observed, also, that the 150,000 men for which we engaged were exclusive of garrisons; and that the men in Ostend and Antwerp (of which I do not recollect the number) might be kept there as cheap, if not cheaper, than in England and as their supplies might come chiefly from thence, would not require specie. His idea of the distribution of the remaining 2,100,000l. is to apply a part in the first instance, perhaps to the amount of two-thirds, to the support in part of Dutch (including Belgians) and Hanoverians, exclusive of the Hanoverian Legion, which he considers as part of the British army, and to be paid exclusively by us. The rest to go partly to Hessians, Brunswickers, &c., if they can be detached from the Prussian command, and partly to Bavarians and Wurtembergers (whom he thinks Austria would be more ready to give up than Prussia to give up her dependents in the North), in case it should be thought better not to give these two Powers any share in the 5,000,000l. of direct subsidy, and to quarter them upon the British contingent. The Duke had opposed any definitive arrangement as to the Powers in the north of Germany so as to place them without their consent under the command of Prussia, and left this to be settled by common consent. He thinks that the distribution of this sum had better be left to his arrangement here, and is of opinion that he can prevent the troops acting with us, and only partially paid by us, from being any burden upon our finances beyond the sums stipulated to be paid. 3. Whatever may be held out, it will be impossible to prevent such an army from subsisting de facto at the expense of the invaded country; but the Duke is decidedly of opinion that the contrary principle ought to be professed, and, as far as possible, acted upon. He thinks that a plan may be concerted with the King of France for issuing bons on his account in payment of requisitions; that some French authorities might accompany the army to take the place of those which may retire; and does not foresee from this plan the inconveniences pointed out by Sir C. Stuart. I understood his sentiments on this point to be those of the Allies. He added, that even with this system it would still be necessary, with respect to the British troops (whom it was impossible to keep in order without regular supplies), to take along with them supplies for ten or fifteen days, which they would keep up as well as they could by requisitions. On these points the Duke intends to have a conference with the King of France (I believe to-morrow), and fuller explanation will be given. 4. He considers the Allies to be perfectly determined upon war, it having VOL. X. D |