34 REPORT OF LORD HARROWBY. APRIL, 1815. been decided not to receive any overtures from Buonaparte. The Prussians on the Lower Rhine, i.e., Aix la Chapelle, Mayence, Luxembourg, may be expected to amount to near 200,000 men by the beginning of May; about 100,000 Austrians on the Upper Rhine a week or ten days sooner, with 30,000 Bavarians, and a smaller proportion of Wurtembergers and other lesser Powers; the British, Hanoverian levies, Dutch and Belgians, about the same time, are calculated at 60,000 men in the field; 280,000 Russians may be expected on or near the Rhine by the 10th of May. Great, however, as the force would be (supposing it as high as 300,000 or 350,000 men), still the Duke thinks it would not be advisable to enter France before the arrival of the Russians, as the consequences of a partial check might be dangerous, and the enterprise should not be undertaken without such an overwhelming force as to ensure success as far as possible. He thinks this consideration of still more weight than the additional means which this delay would give to Buonaparte of increasing his own forces. 5. The Allies have settled no declaration, but the substance of any declaration he considers to be comprised in the treaty they have signed. The great object to be the demolition of the power of Buonaparte, as inconsistent with the general security. If the King of France accedes as a contracting party to the treaty, it seems impossible to avoid stating as the object also the re-establishment of his authority. 6 and 7. Left for concert with the King of France: more cannot be said at present. 8. The same. 9. To be fully considered, but may wait. 10. In this case the Duke thinks Buonaparte ought to be pursued wherever he may go; and if he sets up the seat of the government at any other town, Paris must be the seat of the government opposed to him. 11. If the Allies are forced to give up the prosecution of the war previous to the complete destruction of Napoleon's power, it does not seem probable they should be in such a commanding situation as to extort either dismemberment, contribution, or surrender of fortresses. If the King is replaced, any such idea would be highly impolitic. 12. The option has been made at Vienna; but though it is impossible to calculate the dangers of an unsuccessful attempt, there appears so great a probability of success with the force now about to be collected, that the attempt appears decidedly preferable to a temporary inaction. Although the forces to be maintained according to the defensive system of Chaumont might be sufficient for a very short time to overawe Buonaparte from making an attack with his present means, the expense would be very great; and as he would be perpetually and rapidly increasing his means of offence, the means of defence must be proportionably increased, with the certainty after all that he must make war, would make it at the moment of his choice, when the Sovereigns would have been separated, their armies further removed, and means afforded of sowing amongst them the seeds of dissension. 13. No plan of campaign is definitively settled. The general idea is that the whole force should enter between the Rhine and the Sambre, the Prussians composing the centre, the Austrians the left, the British the right, the Russians chiefly as a reserve. This plan is adopted with a view MEMORANDUM BY THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL. 35 of making it impossible for Buonaparte to attack them in detail. The plan is to be settled, de commun accord, when the Sovereigns come down to Frankfort or Augsburg, by the Emperor of Russia with Volkonsky, the King of Prussia with Knesebeck, Prince Schwarzenberg on the part of Austria, and some person on the part of England. 14. The Allies consider themselves as being in an intermediate state, and will not declare till their forces are assembled. The Duke considers a temporary delay on this point as desirable for Belgium. 15, 16, 17, 18. Have already been answered by the Duke in his preceding despatches. I am obliged to go to dine with the King, and must conclude, begging you to excuse the very hasty and imperfect manner in which I have executed my intention. It is not, however, I trust, materially erroneous, as the Duke, who happened to come in as I was on the point of concluding it, has read the whole of it, and does not wish to correct any part, though much remains for future explanation. I wrote without the advantage of Pole's assistance, but have had that of his subsequent inspection. Believe me, my dear Lord Castlereagh, ever faithfully yours, P.S.-I have not been able even to read this over myself. [ENCLOSURES.] HARROWBY. MEMORANDUM (A.) BY LORD LIVERPOOL. London, 1st April, 1815. At the commencement of a contest so serious and critical as that which is about to take place, it may be material to look to every contingency with a view of endeavouring to form beforehand some judgment of what may be proper to be done in each particular case as it may occur. Considering the amount of the Allied force to be assembled on the frontier of France, and the present condition and numbers of the army of that country, as well as the unsettled state of its government, there is every reason to hope that the military operations of the Allies, if combined with prudence, may be attended with complete success. In this respect, however, our expectations may be disappointed; and they may be disappointed from various causes of a different nature, for which different remedies will be required. First. The Allied armies may be defeated in their invasion of France. This is a contingency which, however improbable in this case, must always be considered as possible. In such case we shall be reduced to a defensive, and in what way that defensive is to be carried on must depend on circumstances which can only be decided at the time. But secondly, supposing the Allies to penetrate into the interior of France, and to obtain again possession of Paris, and supposing Buonaparte to retire with his army beyond the Loire, what course of military operations would it be then practicable and prudent to adopt? and what are the best means of guarding against the consequences of such an event? On this point the Duke of Wellington's opinion would be particularly desirable. Thirdly. Supposing the French army to be so completely defeated as to 36 QUESTIONS BY THE EARL OF LIVERPOOL. APRIL, 1815. make their retreat in force impossible, and supposing Buonaparte to escape personally, and to embark on board a ship of war in any of the French ports with a view of going to America; in such case he would have the same chance of returning again to France as he has lately had, and a crisis not very different from the present might again occur. Can the two latter contingencies be guarded against in any other way than by endeavouring to get possession of some of the large fortresses in France; say, Lille, Metz, and Strasbourg, to be restored in case of complete success (viz., the destruction of Buonaparte), but in any other contingency to be held by the Allies at least for a given number of years as a security against the renewal of the same dangers to Europe? Is it necessary for any such purpose that the movement of the Allies in force into the interior of France should be delayed? If so, this might constitute a serious objection to the proposal. But if the force of the Allies shall really amount to between 800,000 and 900,000 men, might not such an arrangement be made as would secure the acquisition of some of the most important fortresses of France before the close of the present campaign, particularly considering the defective state of defence in which some of them are at the present moment? LIVERPOOL. II. MEMORANDUM (B.) BY LORD LIVERPOOL. 1st April, 1815. 1. What the sentiments and determinations of the Powers are likely to be, under the adverse circumstances which have occurred since their declaration of March 13th, 1815. 2. May it be presumed that they will cordially unite and persevere in a contest against France for the overthrow of Napoleon, under the new circumstances, upon the scale of subsidy which the Duke of Wellington has been authorised to propose to them?* 3. Supposing the Powers determined on war, within what time may offensive operations against France be entered upon generally or partially, regard being had to the supposed strength and state of the preparations of the enemy, and the importance of acting vigorously before Napoleon can have the means of calling forth the resources of France? 4. What system is it proposed to adopt on entering France, with respect to the maintenance of the Allied troops? 5. What declaration should the Allies adopt, or is the King prepared to adopt, in the present conjuncture, towards his subjects, on the entry of the Allies into France? 6. What system to be adopted with respect to organising, arming, or paying French subjects offering to enrol for the King? 7. What with respect to officers and soldiers withdrawing from Napoleon and declaring for the King? 8. What with respect to individuals or districts on the advance of the Allies declaring for the King? 9. What in case Buonaparte is obliged to fly, and should succeed in withdrawing to a neutral country, suppose America? 10. What in case the Government Archives, Courts of Justice, and Works of Art, covered by the army, should be removed from Paris, before the Allies reach that capital, either beyond the Loire or elsewhere? * 5,000,000l. Subsidy; 6,000,000l. to cover British Contingent. LORD HARROWBY'S INTERVIEW WITH LOUIS XVIII. 37 11. What measures of security, consistent with the laws of war, may the Allies look to, either upon a principle of dismemberment, contribution, or surrender of fortresses, in the event of their not obtaining the main object of security, viz., the destruction of Napoleon's power? 12. What may be presumed to be the dangers of an unsuccessful attempt by invasion to re-establish the King's authority, as compared with those of the European Powers being united in a defensive engagement, with stipulated succours, to repel any attack by France upon the limits as settled by the Peace of Paris? 13. What plan of campaign has been decided upon by the Allies, or, if not settled, by whom and when is this to be settled? 14. Do the Allies consider themselves under their declaration as at war with France, or for what further deliberation does this decision wait; and when may it be expected to be decided? 15. Where are the Sovereigns now supposed to be, and what are their intended motions? 16. What is likely to be their policy about Naples? 17. What about Switzerland? 18. How far have the arrangements agreed upon at Vienna been carried into final execution? III. LIVERPOOL. MEMORANDUM (C.) BY LORD HARROWBY OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH LOUIS XVIII. The King stated briefly the circumstances which had led to his present situation, and what he thought of the actual state of affairs. The army generally, but not universally, against him. In many regiments there were a considerable number of officers and soldiers well disposed: he believed some whole regiments; but only mentioned one, the 1st, which bore his own name, and which has since kept within the barracks. The people, excepting the countries where the Allies had chiefly acted (Alsace, part of Lorraine, Champagne, Burgundy, Franche Comté), he believed to be in his favour. His retreat was more of a triumph than his entry, because, though the people knew he was on his retreat, they showed as many overt proofs of enthusiasm as at his coming. He had little knowledge of what was passing at this moment in the south or the west; that the first attempt of the Duke de Bourbon had failed, from a misintelligence with D'Autichamps, who was not a man to be trusted. He was aware that the general disposition in his favour was an inert disposition; and that, even where the strongest, it could not act effectually without support; but that his cause stood in some respects better than it did last year, because it might then be doubted what were the real inclinations of the people towards him, whereas now they were certain. He had had great hopes of retaining Lille, but when it became necessary to quit it, Dunkirk was his object; that he should have succeeded from the influence of the mayor, the good disposition of a great majority of the inhabitants, and even of a part of the troops, but attributed the failure partly to the interception of some orders, and partly to the impossibility of keeping together the household troops, who, as well as their horses, were done up. His coming to Ostend was with a view to Dunkirk, and not with any idea of coming to England, although he had no doubt of the reception he should have met with. 38 LORD HARROWBY'S INTERVIEW WITH LOUIS XVIII. Lord Harrowby said there could be no doubt of that, but acknowledged that his arrival there had excited considerable apprehensions that such might be his intentions, and that our fears arose from the persuasion that his retreat into England particularly might have the worst effects upon his cause in France. The King fell in with this idea most cordially, and said, "C'est là, la véritable amitié." He added that he had the greatest gratitude to, and the fullest confidence in, the Prince Regent, his government, and John Bull. Lord Harrowby said he might be perfectly sure that England would never be behindhand in the general effort of the Continent, but that we could do nothing effectual alone. He stated his perfect satisfaction in this degree of assurance, and his sense of the absolute necessity of a general and immediate effort. On the last point he laid great stress, frequently mentioned Buonaparte's great activity, and that though now to a considerable degree unprepared, he could do more in less time than another man, and that time would cool the present enthusiasm of the people. The last accounts from Vienna were excellent, but he did not particularise or mention any intelligence as from Talleyrand. A lady had heard the Emperor of Russia say that he was sensible he had been too generous to that scoundrel, but that it was the more his business to repair the fault, and that he and all his nation would use the utmost efforts to replace the King on the throne. He urged the necessity of avoiding sieges, and making straight to Paris. Referring to the excellent effect which had been produced by the conduct of the troops under the Duke of Wellington in not living upon the country, and the bad consequences of a different conduct on the part of the Allies, in the same terms he had used to Sir Charles Stuart, he expressed a hope that the same conciliatory system might be pursued. Lord Harrowby said that even if it were possible for England to support this expense with respect to the troops under English orders, this would only aggravate the odium of a different system on the part of the other belligerents; that the march of 300,000 or 400,000 troops into France, if they were all on a plan of forbearance, would incur an expense totally out of the question; that although England would not be behindhand, it would be deceiving His Majesty to allow him to suppose that she was capable of efforts to such an extent as she had made in the two last years, during the last of which she had spent 30,000,000l. on the Continent. On Lord Harrowby adding that the ideas His Majesty had stated were what came naturally from the father of his people, but that we had done the impossible already, and could not do it again, he acquiesced with apparent conviction, as if he had pressed the topic from a sense of propriety rather than from a feeling of practicability, and dropped it with the expression of "We must try to consider if any arrangements can be made." Recurring in the course of the conversation to his stay at Ostend, he said he had been happy that so many packets had left it for England, as this was a proof that, having the power of going there himself, he had not the intention. Lord Harrowby said then, and on other occasions, that what we felt to be most important was, that His Majesty should himself be able to raise his own standard in some part of France; but this never produced any indication on his part of an intention of going to the west or the south. He always recurred to his hopes of Dunkirk; and on asking him on what they rested, and with what force he meant to keep it, he referred to what he had said before, that he should have had force enough if he could have kept together his household troops, but that even now there might be force to keep it; that he should not like to introduce English troops there, although he should willingly see them in Lille, because, Dunkirk having once been English, he should be said to have sold it. |