FORCE REQUIRED BY THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON. 49

Major-Gen. Sir H. Torrens to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington. MY DEAR LORD Duke, Ghent, 9th April, 1815.

I send you the copy of the paper I showed you this morning; and if anything shall occur to you in which you think I can be of use, I beg you will write to me. I wish to God you had a better army. But still I must repeat my conviction that it is left to you to have the principal hand in the final destruction of Buonaparte. Right sorry am I to turn my back upon the active operations before you; but of this I must not think.

I forgot to say that William Ponsonby is intended for the command of the heavy brigade of cavalry coming out.

Believe me, my dear Duke, to remain,

With the most sincere regard and respect,

Yours ever most faithfully,

H. TORRENS.

I wrote from Brussels the day before yesterday to urge the immediate augmentation of the Waggon Train for your hospital equipment of waggons. H. T.

[ENCLOSURE.]

MEMORANDUM.

Ghent, 8th April, 1815.

The Duke of Wellington has stated that he will require for the approaching operations in the field 150 pieces of artillery, completely manned and horsed, 15,000 cavalry, and 40,000 infantry, composed of British and the King's German Legion.

His Grace will consent that the light dragoons of the Hanoverian Landwehr shall be included in the estimate of cavalry.

The following statement will show how far it may be possible to collect troops within any reasonable time towards the completion of this force of cavalry and infantry.

VOL. X.

1st Dragoon Guards, 2nd Dragoons, and 6th Dragoons 1,300

50 MEANS OF RAISING THE REQUIRED FORCE. APRIL, 1815.

By the present returns,

The infantry in Brabant, composed of British troops
and King's German Legion, consist of
Expected immediately, and not included in these

returns, viz. :

Foot Guards

..

15,511

1,800

If a limited portion of the Militia should be immediately called out, the measure could not be carried into effect so as to render disposable any of the troops in Great Britain and Ireland at an earlier period than the latter end of next month, when it has been already shown that 6000 infantry may be obtained by the probable arrival of the force under Major-General Sir John Lambert.

Should government, however, determine upon embodying the Militia, it does not appear that the measure could be attended by the relief of more than four regiments of cavalry from Great Britain, and three from Ireland; and it is only by the early accomplishment of an augmentation of a fifth squadron to cach regiment that so much cavalry could be spared from the interior and coast duties of both countries.*

Supposing this Militia arrangement to be immediately adopted, it might possibly afford a reinforcement of 2800 cavalry and about 4000 infantry † for Brabant.

It is just possible that an arrangement may be made for relieving two battalions of the line at Gibraltar, either by veteran battalions or weak 2nd battalions of the line. I cannot speak, however, with confidence on this point, as the garrison only now consists of 3600 men, and there are only two corps in it fit for field service. Perhaps by ordering a corps down from the Mediterranean this arrangement could be effected, and, if so, it would afford 1800 disposable infantry.

Beyond this exertion I cannot anticipate the feasibility of assembling any disposable force previous to the arrival of the army from Halifax and St. Lawrence.

The following is accordingly the state of these possible reinforcements, including what has been already stated to be expected from America :

Cavalry +

2800

Such a reinforcement of cavalry would only leave three regiments in Ireland, and five in Great Britain, including the Life Guards.

† From Ireland.

Consequent upon embodying the militia.

It will thus be seen that by deducting the above proposed reinforcement of 2800 cavalry from the number † wanting to complete the Duke of Wellington's proposed force, there will still remain the immense deficit of more than 4000 cavalry; and with regard to the infantry, there could be little more collected by the month of September than what his Grace would require for the commencement of operations in the middle of May; and no notice is herein taken of the casualties which even in the ordinary course of the service must occur in the existing force in Brabant, and to meet which we can only depend on the recruiting.

N.B.-The force would be eventually as follows:

Cavalry:

H. TORRENS.

British and Germans, deducting 2500 for garrisons.. 17,511
Proposed reinforcements

23,300

40,811

Total, 51,503 cavalry and infantry, exclusive of the Ordnance equipment.

General Röder to ‡

Bruxelles, le 9 Avril, 1815.

Vous avez lu, mon très cher Général, le petit mémoire que j'ai adressé hier à Milord Duc Wellington. Ne le trouvant pas chez lui, je n'ai pas pu le présenter moi-même, et je l'ai laissé à son hôtel. Vous y avez vu les points sur lesquelles le Général Gneisenau désire d'être informé, et j'ose vous inviter d'employer tout votre crédit pour que le Duc y réponde le plus tôt que possible, parceque je crois que cela est de la plus haute importance pour le bien de la cause commune.

Vous n'ignorez pas les raisons qui obligent l'armée du Bas-Rhin de ne pas trop s'éloigner de la Meuse, et vous conviendrez qu'elles sont bien fondées ces mêmes raisons lui font plus craindre que désirer une bataille entre Bruxelles et les frontières, qui en cas de revers auroit les suites les plus fâcheuses pour elle, en lui coupant sa retraite derrière la Meuse, et en laissant à l'ennemi la liberté de s'avancer par Liège vers le Rhin, où se trouvent tous les points de rassemblement pour la formation des armées

* Ditto, exclusive of what will be drawn from Ireland.
+ Wanting, 7108; deduct, 2800; remaining deficit, 4308.
Blank in manuscript.

52 FORWARD MOVEMENT OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMY.

Prussiennes venantes de l'intérieur, et destinées à faire la guerre de ce côté-ci-vous sentez vous-même, cher Général, sans que j'ai besoin d'en développer des détails, quel malheur affreux ce seroit pour nous tous, si ces formations seroient interrompues et dérangées avant d'être finies; et que probablement cela nous ferait perdre les avantages de toute une campagne, peut-être de toute la guerre.

Ces considérations doivent nécessairement gêner le Général commandant en chef l'armée du Bas-Rhin, et lui donner des vives inquiétudes sur les chances d'une bataille, aussi longtems qu'il est chargé de la responsabilité des suites. Le Général Gneisenau a bien prouvé qu'il désire sincèrement d'opérer de concert avec Milord Duc Wellington en faisant avancer les troupes sous ses ordres sur les points où on les a demandés, sans même attendre qu'il fut instruit du plan général : cependant cette condescendance à la volonté du Duc, suite d'une confiance sans bornes accordée à la personne du plus grand général de l'Europe, ne doit pas être considérée encore comme le consentiment décidé de s'exposer dans tous les cas au sort d'une bataille en avant de Bruxelles, et dont les suites, supposant la possibilité qu'elle fut perdue, seroient trop funestes pour nous.

Le Général Gneisenau espère que le mouvement en avant de l'armée Prussienne, et son rapprochement à l'armée Anglo-Batave, suffira pour imposer à l'ennemi et pour l'empêcher de tomber sur celle-ci avec toutes ses forces; et c'est en partant de ce point de vue qu'il y a consenti, saus cependant s'engager au delà. C'est ce que j'ai l'ordre de vous dire de sa part; mais j'ose y encore ajouter de la mienne qu'il me paroît que toute cette affaire dépendra des communications que le Duc Wellington daignera faire à M. de Gneisenau, et que par conséquent je reviens à la nécessité et l'importance de ce qu'elles se fassent le plus tôt que possible.

L'amitié et la confiance que vous avez inspiré à nos chefs, et à tous les Prussiens qui jouissent de l'avantage de vous connoître, leurs font espérer que vous ne refuserez pas d'être l'interprète de nos sentiments auprès de Milord Duc Wellington, dont toute l'armée Prussienne est jalouse de mériter la bienveillance et le contentement. C'est pour cela que je suis chargé positivement de m'adresser à vous dans toutes les circonstances, ce que je fais avec le plus grand plaisir, rien n'égalant la haute et parfaite considération avec laquelle j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Mon très cher et très honoré Général,

Votre très humble et très obéissant serviteur,

F. RÖDER.

Major-Gen. Sir W. Dörnberg to Colonel J. Colborne.

MY DEAR SIR,

Mons, 9th April, 1815. By one of the confidential persons employed by me, just returned from the frontiers, I find the French have not yet assembled anywhere in our neighbourhood a considerable corps. The regiments are marching forwards and backwards so often that it is difficult to follow their movements, particularly as it happened several times that regiments on their march received contre ordre, and returned; so that you got a report from one man such a regiment is marching in such a direction, and from another

MARCH OF THE HANOVERIAN ARMY OF RESERVE. 53

man you got a contrary report, which is equally true. The man I am now speaking of, found at Maubeuge, on the 6th instant, the 13th dragoons, 3rd and 76th line; and the 4th Chasseurs à cheval, and 1st of the line, on their march to Maubeuge. The 1st of the line has since been marched again to Valenciennes, and from thence to Douai; the 76th line was also under orders yesterday to march to Valenciennes. Some squadrons of the 4th Chasseurs arrived yesterday at Salre sur Sambre and Beaumont.

The above mentioned man found at Cambrai, the 7th instant, from 4000 to 5000 infantry, and two regiments of cavalry, of which one was the 9th Chasseurs; the same day at Douai, the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 57th line, and three regiments of Cuirassiers, one of which had orders to march to Metz. At Lens he found, on the 8th instant, about 4000 infantry. I forgot to mention at Douai a train of field artillery, and all the troops under the command of General Cosselly.

By another man I learn this morning that several regiments entered yesterday at Valenciennes, which is represented as very crowded this moment.

Several French officers on half-pay are returned from Paris without having been employed.

Believe me, my dear Sir, most faithfully yours,

DÖRNBERG.

MY LORD,

Sir C. Stuart to Field Marshal the Duke of Wellington.

Brussels, 9th April, 1815.

I have the honour to transmit your Grace the accompanying copy of a letter I have received from His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge, announcing the march of the Hanoverian army of reserve to Antwerp, and requesting that measures which are necessary to ensure their regular supplies should be adopted as early as the time will admit.

Presuming that the general arrangements of the army under your Lordship's command will be applicable to the Hanoverians, I cannot better forward His Royal Highness's wishes than by adding the enclosed march route and the returns of this corps.

I have the honour to be, with great truth and respect, my Lord,
Your Grace's most obedient servant,

[ENCLOSURES.]

I.

CHARLES STUART.

SIR,

The Duke of Cambridge to Sir C. Stuart.

Hanover, 4th April, 1815. The messenger Vick arrived here this morning at half-past six o'clock, and delivered me your letter dated Brussels, 30th March, containing one enclosure. I have in consequence given the necessary orders for the immediate march of the troops, which they will begin on the 9th instant: they are directed upon Antwerp, where they will expect to receive further orders from the Duke of Wellington.