at the choice of the Governor-General; viz. that of alliance with Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabul, and his brothers the chiefs of Candahar. It is a point much nicer than the preliminary question of interference-whether Lord Auckland acted wisely or unwisely in resolving not to form a connexion with those parties, but to ground our Indian relations with Affghanistan upon the re-establishment of Shah Shooja on the throne of his ancestors?

As that restoration could be effected only by British arms, or rather, as any attempt to bring it about by other means would have been attended with the hazard of a mischievous failure, it is certain that measures taken in alliance with chiefs ruling de facto over Eastern Affghanistan, and largely in possession of the resources of the country, seemed to promise the attainment of the same ends at a less immediate expense of treasure, and probably of blood, than those actually resorted to. It may be assumed, also, that such a connexion as might have been formed with Dost Mahomed Khan and his brethren, (the chiefs of the Barukzye family and tribe,) whilst it might have sufficed to detach those parties from Persia, and to protect British India from all mischief from that quarter, would not have laid us under such indefinite obligations, threatening future embarrassment, as the relations in which we have been compelled to bind ourselves to Shah Shooja.

Having said this, we think that we have stated fairly the strongest ground that can, with truth and reason, be taken by those who, thinking that interference with the affairs of Affghanistan was essential to the protection of British interests, are nevertheless of opinion that the Governor-General acted unwisely in not availing himself of the assistance of the actually established government. But, as is usual, when the merits and demerits of a line of policy actually allowed, are weighed against advantages and disadvantages which can be regarded only as in posse, much more is taken for granted in disparagement of the former, and in favour of the latter, than the real state of facts and candid inferences from them will warrant.

It is assumed, for instance, that the chiefs of Cabul and Candahar were not only extremely well affected towards the British Government, and disposed to enter into a cordial alliance with it, to the abandonment of all hopes of support from the westward; but that they possessed a firm hold upon the affections of the people over whom they ruled, and were indissolubly bound together by the strongest ties, both of blood and affection, and of mutual interest. Shah Shooja, on the other hand, has been represented as the most imbecile and helpless of pretenders to a

throne which he had lost by his own incompetence, and the contempt, if not hatred, of his subjects; and on which he can be maintained, as he has been reseated, solely by British arms and British treasure. Upon such assumptions, rhetorically enforced, it is easy to found an absolute condemnation of Lord Auckland's policy.

But those who will take the trouble correctly to ascertain, and dispassionately to consider the circumstances, will find, we apprehend, cause to question the justice of such a conclusion. The case, however, is confessedly not one where the preponderance of considerations in one scale is so palpable as to render politics a game which can safely be played, off-hand, by every speculator; the crisis demanded, perhaps as much as any that has occurred during the rise and progress of British ascendancy in the East, that cool judgment to decide, and spirit of devotion to public duty to execute, which are essential to the character of a statesman qualified to lay his hand upon the helm of our Indian empire.

It appears to us that there is sufficient moral evidence to show, first, that Shah Shooja, as the head of the powerful and sacred family of Suddozyes,* is far more acceptable, generally, to the Affghans, than Dost Mahomed, or any other or all of the chiefs of the Barukzyes; secondly, that the latter were not only feeble from division, but were leagued together by no ties that would not have been broken, on the instant the chief of Cabul thought that he could possess himself of the territory of Candahar, or that the chiefs of Candahar saw reason to believe that they could eject their brother from Cabul; thirdly, that if any of these chiefs ever had any real apprehension of Persia, it was very slight and transient, and that the true object of their negotiations, both with that power and with the Governor-General, was to strengthen themselves against each other, and against the Suddozyes, as represented by Shah Shooja or Prince Kamran of Herat, and to obtain the means of repelling the Seikhs; and fourthly, that if our course of policy had been such as to permit Persia, backed by Russia, to furnish those means-which our relations with Runjeet Singh and our obvious interests equally forbade us to afford the Shah might, by playing off Dost Mahomed against the chiefs of Candahar, and those chiefs against Dost Mahomed, easily have possessed himself of the virtual sovereignty of the country.

*Prince Kamran may contest this rank with him, but he is a man of dissolute and abandoned character, and exceedingly unpopular.

Upon the first point, we have the unequivocal testimony of Captain Conolly, given long before the late crisis, that the right of the Suddozye family to the supreme government has hitherto been considered sacred by the Dooraunees,' (the great predominant tribe to which the Suddozyes and Barukzyes helong;) and that there would always be a strong feeling in their favour, if they put themselves forward.' He even says (after describing in strong terms the demerits of Prince Kamran of Herat,)—that, notwithstanding all his faults, the people would be 'glad to see him restored to the throne; the interests of the Suddozye tribe, and of all the old Dooraunee families, are con→ nected with his; and the Affghans, generally, have in every way suffered so much from the consequences of the revolution, that they would hail the resumption of the royal authority, whether by Kamran or any other man of the family.' These opinions are strongly supported by Sir John M'Neill, in the following passage :—

Though the sovereignty of the Affghans has passed out of the hands of the descendants of Ahmed Shah, the Dooraunee tribe appears to maintain an undoubted ascendancy in the nation. The Barukzyes have usurped the greater portion of the power of the Suddozyes; but the latter family still maintains itself in Herat, and has a strong hold on the prejudices, if not on the affections, of a large part of the Dooraunees.

The Barukzyes holding Cabul and Candahar in independence, and Peshawur as tributaries to the Seikhs, would appear not to have conciliated the attachment of the Dooraunees, and to depend in a great mea sure for their power on influences foreign to that tribe. Dost Mabomed Khan of Cabul, descended by his mother from the Kuzzilbashes, or Persians, who have for some generations been settled in Cabul, has connected himself with that powerful body, and in any emergency must trust rather to them than to the native Affghans for the means of pursuing conquest or repelling aggressions.'

Major Wade and Mr Masson entirely conçur in these sentiments. The latter, who has lived long among the Affghans, and knows them intimately, wrote in 1835 as follows:—

The failure of Shah Shooja is now most sincerely lamented. I my self rejoiced at the time; but the course of events seems to prove that his success would have been felicitous to the countries. The wishes of all classes turn to his restoration.'-Again,-'I confess I am not very sanguine as to any very favourable results from negotiations with the Barukzyes. They are indeed their own enemies; but their eternal and unholy dissensions and enmities have brought them to be considered as pests to the country; and the likelihood is, that affairs will become worse, not Letter. The British Government could employ interference, without offending half a dozen individuals. Shah Shooja, under their auspices, would not even encounter opposition; and the Ameer and his friends,

if he have any, must yield to his terms, or become fugitives.'-' Of Shah Shooja,' says Lieutenant Leech, they' (the chiefs of Candahar) stand in the greatest dread, as he is extremely popular in Affghanistan; and the tyranny of the upstart Barukzyes has effaced from the mind of the Affghans that of the Suddozyes, while the former cannot support the dignity, the power, or the show of monarchy.'*

The soundness of these views has been abundantly substantiated by the events of the expedition. The difficulties experienced were solely those of toil and privation; owing principally to the natural wildness and desolation of the country between the Indus and Candahar, which is absolutely devoid of vegetation, and where the army was constantly obliged to make marches of twenty miles in order to find water. But the reception of Shah Shooja at Candahar-which is situated in a lovely and very fertile country-was most enthusiastic. The Barukzye chiefs fled before him without striking a blow, and with scarcely two hundred followers. Their most confidential servants deserted them. The whole population, high and low, came out to meet Shah Shooja, bringing garlands of flowers, and strewing the roads with roses. On the march from Candahar to Cabul, Ghuzni was the only place where resistance was offered, and that, probably, only because the garrison was commanded by Dost Mahomed's favourite son. After its fall, Dost Mahomed's army of twelve thousand men deserted him; leaving him to fly almost unattended, and all his guns-twenty-eight in number-to be taken possession of by a single squadron of dragoons. In fact, with the exception of the conflict at Ghuzni, the sovereignty of Eastern Affghanistan was transferred to Shah Shooja without any struggle. Power which had a real basis either in the affections of the people, or in the ability and resources of those who swayed it, and which was fit to be relied upon as a barrier to British India, could not thus have crumbled away from its own want of consistence. The fact that the country was overrun by bands of armed plunderers, who treated English officers, or other stragglers from the British camp, with no more respect than other equally tempting prizes, proves nothing (in a country like Affghanistan, where whole tribes have been predatory by profession from time immemorial, and which has been in a state of disorganization for more than half a century) against the general popularity of Shah Shooja's cause. Life and property were not a whit more secure when Mr Elphinstone visited the

*Political Reports, published by the Government of Calcutta. Pp. 63-4.

country thirty years ago: his work abounds with anecdotes of habitual rapine; and even the nobleman sent to meet and conduct him to court, very narrowly escaped being plundered. It is no marvel that, in such a state of society, the love of booty should be with thousands stronger than attachment to a dynasty. We doubt not, however, that the followers of Dost Mahomed were plundered, as opportunity offered, with great impartiality.

We will say a few words in this place as to the character of Shah Shooja. It has been the habit of those who have blamed Lord Auckland for taking up his cause, to describe him as in the greatest degree weak and timid. This appears to be entirely gratuitous. His history affords many traits of personal energy and resolution, -too many for his own interests of moderation, benevolence, and forbearance towards thankless opponents. Had he been more unscrupulous in the use of his power, he would probably never have lost it. Mr Elphinstone, whose capacity to judge will be questioned by no one, speaks of him throughout his work in high terms. His only qualifying expression is, that he deems him 'deficient in the genius and energy which were requisite to re'store a government so far sunk into anarchy and decay.' He has since had much good training and experience in the school of adversity. We have Sir Alexander Burnes' testimony, that this experience has raised him, in one respect at least, above the level of his country and station. Speaking some years ago of Shah Shooja's autobiography, presented to him by the King, Sir Alexander says, the book gives a detail of his life and adventures, in a simple style, free from extracts from the Koran, metaphors, and other extravagances of Oriental authors. It also dispenses with any mention of those miracles which never fail to be wrought in favour of an Eastern despot, according to the ' account of historians. The work, in fact, was what would be 'described by us as an interesting detail of events.' A Mahomedan prince capable of drawing up such a narrative, and of acting with the skill and resolution which he displayed in effecting his escape, and that of his family, from the clutches of one so vigilant as Runjeet Singh, as well as on other occasions, cannot well be viewed as either a fool or a poltron.

There is abundant evidence to establish the weakness and disunion of the Barukzye Chiefs. We have seen what Mr Masson says of their eternal and unholy dissensions and enmities,' which had brought them, in 1835, long before the necessity for our interference in the affairs of Affghanistan was contemplated, to be considered as the pests of the country. Captain Conolly, writing at a still earlier period, though he speaks favourably by comparison with Dost Mahomed, reprobates in the strongest terms